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NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The nature of the case, the course of proceedings and 
disposition of the case in the Sixth Judicial District Court 
are as stated in the Brief of the AppelJLant. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTER FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the record support the findings of the District 
Court that an existing fence observed, acquiesced in and 
repaired by the parties for a period of more than 77 years 
become a property boundary by acquiescence? 
2. Does the status of a boundary line fence by 
acquiescence change because the fence also controls livestock 
of adjoining landowners? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS 
This appeal does not present any constitutional provision, 
statute, ordinance, rule or regulation the interpretation of 
which would be determinative of the issues of this case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Van Dyke is the owner of real property located in Wayne 
County, State of Utah, the boundary of which is the subject 
matter of this action. Van Dyke's property is bounded by an 
ancient fence on the south.1 
Chappells are the owners of real property located south of 
the Plaintiff's property and bounded on the north by the common 
ancient fence between the respective tracts.2 
The Chappells caused their property to be surveyed in June 
of 1987. Chappells' surveyor concluded the ancient fence was 
not on the record boundary between the properties but 
encroached upon Chappells' property3 causing a dispute which 
resulted in this litigation. 
The evidence is uncontradicted that the fence between the 
1Exhibits: 
6 & 19 - Deeds to respective parties 
8, 9, 17 - County plats and survey plats 
2Exhibits: 
6 & 19 - Deeds to respective parties 
8, 9, 17 - County plats and survey plats 
3Exhibit 17 - Surveyor's plat 
Tr. 137, 138 (Testimony of Rodney Torgerson, Surveyor) 
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parties was constructed of permanent cedar posts and poles 
about the year of 1911.4 The fence was built as a joint 
fencing project between Benjamin Turner, a predecessor in title 
to Van Dyke and by George Chappell, a predecessor in title to 
the Chappells.5 The fence between the properties of Van Dyke 
and Chappells extends to the east and separates properties of 
other owners on the south of the fence from properties on the 
north of the fence;6 the fence likewise extends to the west 
beyond the property of Chappells and divides properties owned 
by others (Max Chappell) on the south of the fence of Van Dyke 
who owns property on the north. The fence continues on a 
virtually due west course beyond the properties of these 
parties, dividing lands of other proprietors on the north and 
south, respectively.7 The fence continues to run to the west 
as outlined for a distance of approximately three miles across 
4Tr.l31, Glen Chappell. age 80 (father of Appellant) 
Tr.131, L3: "As I can tell for sure. 3ft was built 
about 1911." 
Tr.18, 19: Van Dyke, age 78, observed maintained integrity of 
fence for 64 years. 
Tr.42,43: Laverl Torgerson. age 78, observed maintained 
integrity of fence for 69 years. 
Tr.121: Marion Glen Chappell. age 37 - fence there during his 
entire lifetime. 
Tr.5: Rene Van Dyke, age 33 - observed maintained integrity 
of fence for 25 years. 
5Tr.l27, L 21. 
6Tr.55; Tr.63,65; See Exs 14, 15-16 (aerial photos) 
7Tr.40; Tr.55; Tr.61-62; See Exs. 14, 15-16. 
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the Lyman-Loa valley.8 The line in question is the center line 
of the section (§9) running east and west.* 
The fence in dispute was repaired and improved by 
replacing part of the poles with net wire in the year of 1933 
or 1934.9 Van Dyke's predecessor in interest, Benjamin Turner, 
furnished the materials to go into the fence and the owners of 
the property south of the fenceline furnished the labor for the 
fence repair and neither the alignment nor the location was 
changed.10 
The field notes of a 1966 survey authorized by the Bureau 
of Land Management relied heavily upon a survey of 1935. The 
field notes show that none of the section corners of Section 9, 
Township 28 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian 
were in place. The surveyors relied upon the fences in place 
to re-establish the corners and quarter corners. One of the 
fences relied upon was a west extension of the fence which is 
the subject matter of this litigation.11 
The parties to this action and their predecessors have 
acquiesced in the boundary line fence for a period of at least 
8Tr.39, 40; Tr. 55; Exs. 14, 15, 16. 
*Exs. 7, 8, 9 and 17. 
9Tr.22; Tr.44;Tr. 51. 
10Tr.22; Tr.44; Tr.51. 
i:LEx. 10, Field Notes, p. 336: "Point for the 1/4 sec. 
corner of sees. 8 and 9 as determined by old property fence 
cor. bears E., W. and N., and it's believed to be a 
perpetuation of the original cor. position." 
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77 years. The Chappells have recognized Van Dyke's ownership 
in the property immediately north of the boundary fence.12 
In the year of 1984 Chappells secured permission from Van 
Dyke to build a corral upon property north of and bounded on 
the south by the fence.13 Chappells removed the improvements 
when requested to do so and paid Van Dyke rent for the use of 
the land north of the fence.14 
Van Dyke and his predecessors in title have had the 
continuous use and occupancy of the real property north of the 
old fenceline (T.19-24). Likewise, Chappells and their 
predecessors in title have had the continuous use of the 
property south of the fence (T.103 & 125-130). (This paragraph 
restates and agrees with the statement made by Appellants on 
page 5 of their Brief). 
12Tr.27, 28, 45, 46. 
Ex. 13: Letter from Marion Chappell to Van Dyke: 
"Enclosed please find your check. I am sending it to 
you as payment of rent on your property that I have been using 
for the past three years. Also as payment for damage to your 
property. 
You sent a message that you had changed your mind 
again and that I could leave the corrals. . . 
I will use my own property from now on. . . 
The only reason I asked you for permission to build 
them at all was I hoped I could buy another acre from you. You 
said you would think about it everytime I asked you. June 8th 
you said NO. The corrals will be torn down as soon as I can." 
13Ex. 13. See Note 12. 
14Tr.27,28. Witness: Welby Van Dyk0 
Ex.13: 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court correctly ruled that an ancient fenceline 
in existence for 77 years was acquiesced in by the adjoining 
proprietors and became the boundary as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EXISTING FENCE HAS BEEN OBSERVED, ACQUIESCED IN, 
REPAIRED AND MAINTAINED BY THE PARTIES FOR A PERIOD 
OF 77 YEARS PRIOR TO THE EXISTING BOUNDARY DISPUTE. 
In this case, the Trial Court heard the evidence offered, 
made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.55-62; copies 
are attached to Appellants' Brief) finding and concluding that 
the fenceline is the boundary between the parties rather than 
the new survey line. The decision of the Court was based on 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
In Staker vs. Ainsworth, 125 Utah Adv.Rep. 25, (Opinion 
filed January 8, 1990) Justice Durham outlined the doctrine: 
Historically, the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence included four factors: "(1) occupation 
up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences, or 
buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a 
boundary, (3) for a long period of time (4) by 
adjoining landowners.11 Goodman vs. Wilkinson, 629 
P2d 447, 448 (Utah 1981); 12 Am.Jur.2d Boundaries, 
§85 (1964 & Supp. 1989). In Halladay vs. Cluff. 685 
P2d 500 (Utah 1984), this Court added a fifth element 
to this list of factors: "objective uncertainty" as 
defined in that case. 
To the extent that Halladay vs. Cluff, and its progeny 
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added the fifth requirement of "objective uncertainty" that 
requirement was overruled by Staker. 
The facts in this case are to be reviewed in the light 
most favorable to the Findings of Fact made by the District 
Court. Valley Bank & Trust Co. vs. First Security. 538 P2d 
298. This Court has held the standard 4>f review in connection 
with a Finding of Fact made by the Trial Judge requires the 
Finding to be upheld even though the Supreme Court may disagree 
with him. (Id.) 
To demonstrate the Findings are supported by the evidence, 
the Respondent's Statement of Facts has been documented to the 
transcript, exhibits and record. We briefly review the facts 
here in the light of the four factors required to be proved by 
Van Dyke. 
1. Occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, 
fences or boundaries. 
The fence was built prior to 1911 and permanent poles and 
posts installed by Benjamin Turner, predecessor in title to Van 
Dyke and by George Chappell, predecessor in title to Chappells. 
The fence was repaired and improved by replacing part of the 
poles with net wire in the year of 1933 or 1934. 
Van Dyke's predecessor in interest, Benjamin Turner, 
furnished the materials to go into the fence and the owners of 
the property on the south (predecessors to Chappells) furnished 
the labor for the fence repair and neither the alignment nor 
the location was changed. 
2. Mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary. 
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Van Dyke and his predecessors raised livestock on the 
property on the north. The livestock included cattle, sheep, 
turkeys, chickens and goats. They fed sheep in the disputed 
area and used the disputed area for grazing, corrals and for 
the maintaining of livestock. 
Chappells used the property on the south of the fenceline 
for the raising of livestock for farming and for other 
purposes. 
We agree with Appellant's statement on page 5 of their 
brief: 
Van Dyke and his predecessors in title have had the 
continuous use and occupancy of the real property 
north of the old fenceline (T.19-24). Likewise, 
Chcippells and their predecessors in title have had 
the continuous use of the property south of the fence 
(T.103 & 124-130). 
3. For a long period of time. 
Although the term "long period of time" to establish 
boundary by acquiescence is not set specifically by Utah 
decisions, it is provided in the case of Hobson vs. Panauitch 
Lake, 530 P2d 792 (Utah 1975) that only under unusual 
circumstances would a common law prescriptive period of less 
than 20 years be sufficient to establish a boundary by 
acquiescence. 
The third factor is met by the evidence in this case 
showing the fence to have been in existence for substantially 
more thcin 20 years. The fence was erected about the year of 
1911 and was repaired and extended in the year of 1933 or 1934. 
Therefore, more than 77 years have elapsed since the original 
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construction of the fence and more than 53 years have elapsed 
since the repair and extension• The time period is computed to 
the year of 1988 which is the year this action to quiet title 
was filed. Marian Glen Chappell, Appellant, testified at trial 
concerning the ancient fence: 
Tr. 121: By Mr. Olsen: 
Q Marion, how long have you been acquainted with the 
particular property where your home is now located? 
A Oh, probably ever since I was big enough to walk. 
Q How old are you now? 
A 37. 
Q During your entire lifetime has the fence been there? 
A Yes. It has. 
4. By adjoining landowners. 
Van Dyke and Chappells are adjoining landowners as shown 
by the deeds of the parties, Exs. 6 & 19 and the plats which 
are Exhibits 8, 9 and 17. The fact is also acknowledged by all 
witnesses testifying. 
POINT II 
THE STATUS OF A BOUNDARY LINE FENCE IS NOT CHANGED BY 
THE FACT THE FENCE ALSO CONTROLS LIVESTOCK OF 
ADJOINING LANDOWNERS. 
Appellants suggest that since both parties and their 
predecessors have had livestock from time to time which had to 
be controlled that the fence was built to control livestock and 
was never intended as a boundary fence. 
This is not the evidence. The evidence is that the fence 
was built about 1911 and repaired and improved in 1933 or 1934. 
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The exact agreement between the original builders cannot be 
proved because they are deceased. It is suggested that Van 
Dyke has the burden of proving boundary by agreement or his 
cause of action fails. This is an incorrect view of Utah law. 
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence and burden of proof of 
the parties is outlined by the Court in Motzkus vs. Carroll, 7 
U2d 237, 322 P2d 391, pg. 396 (Utah 1958). Justice Wade, 
writing for the Court, stated: 
[It] is clear that where a party by evidence 
establishes a long period of acquiescence in a fence 
as marking the boundary line between two tracts, he 
is not required to also produce evidence that the 
location of the true boundary line was unknown, 
uncertain or in dispute. The development of a long 
period of acquiescence in a fence as marking the 
boundary line between the two tracts by the 
respective owners gives rise to a presumption that 
the true boundary line was in dispute or uncertain, 
which places, at least, the burden of producing 
evidence that there was no dispute or uncertainty but 
that the true boundary line was known to the 
respective owners on the party claiming that such was 
the fact. Where, as here, there is (no) evidence on 
that question other than the proof of acquiescence in 
the fence as marking the boundary line for the 
required long period of time the trial court must 
find that the boundary line by acquiescence has been 
established. (Emphasis added) 
POINT III 
A SHOWING OF OBJECTIVE UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE TRUE 
BOUNDARY LINE IS NOT REQUIRED BY UTAH LAW. 
Although extensive proof was directed to this point below, 
the requirement of "objective uncertainty" added by Halladay 
vs. Cluff. (supra) has been overruled by Staker vs. Ainsworth, 
(supra). Therefore, this point is not pursued. 
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CONCLUSION 
Van Dyke has met his burden of proving the ancient 
fenceline between the parties was a boundary by acquiescence. 
He has shown (1) occupation by the parties and their 
predecessors up to a marked boundary fence; (2) mutual 
acquiescence in the fenceline as a boundary; (3) for a long 
period of time which is in excess of 77 years; and (4) that the 
acquiescence was by adjoining landowners and their 
predecessors. 
The Trial Court correctly so ruled and the fenceline is 
the boundary line between the parties as a matter of law. 
Van Dyke, therefore, respectfully requests that the Trial 
Court be affirmed. 
DATED this 9th day of March, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN, McIFF & CHAMBERLAIN 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SERVED the foregoing Brief of Respondent upon Appellants 
by hand delivering to their attorney, Mr. Marcus Taylor, 
Labrum, Taylor & Blackwell, Attorneys at Law, P. 0. Box 728, 
108 North Main, Richfield, Utah (84701) four (4) full, true and 
correct copies thereof on this 9th day of March, 1990. 
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